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Abstract. We extend an analytically solvable core-periphery model by introducing a mo-
nopolistically competitive sector of non-tradable goods. We study how trade costs affect
the spatial distribution of economic activity. Trade costs have no effect when the elasticity
of substitution among non-tradable goods is low. In this case, concentration of all produc-
tion (of tradable and non-tradable goods) is the unique equilibrium. When the elasticity
of substitution among non-tradable goods is high, we find two equilibrium configurations:
symmetric dispersion of the production of tradable and non-tradable goods, if trade costs
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production of non-tradable goods, if trade costs are low.
Keywords: New economic geography, Core-periphery model, Footloose entrepreneur, Non-
tradable goods.
JEL Classification Numbers: F12, R12.
? We are grateful to Alper C¸enesiz, Pascal Mossay and seminar participants at U. Vigo and U. Porto for
useful comments. The authors acknowledge support from FCT and FEDER (research grant PTDC/EGE-
ECO/108331/2008). Vasco Leite (040421008@fep.up.pt) acknowledges support from FCT (Ph.D. schol-
arship). Sofia Castro (sdcastro@fep.up.pt) acknowledges support from Centro de Matema´tica da Uni-
versidade do Porto, financed by FCT through the programmes POCTI and POSI. Joa˜o Correia-da-Silva
(joao@fep.up.pt) acknowledges support from CEF.UP.
1
1 Introduction
The literature on new economic geography has grown extensively over the two last decades.
The idea of trade and geography in general equilibrium models was introduced for the first
time by Krugman (1991), who developed a model illustrating how a country can endoge-
nously become differentiated into an industrialized core and an agricultural periphery. In
this model, trade costs are crucial to explain the spatial distribution of economic activity.
If trade costs are high, industrial activity is dispersed across regions, while if trade costs are
low, then industrial activity becomes concentrated in one region.
Despite it being a stylized fact that services (which are mainly non-tradable) have a very
significant weight in the developed economies, representing more than two thirds of the
total employment in the EU27, the standard literature in new economic geography assumes
that regions have an “agricultural” sector (which produces perfectly tradable goods) and an
“industrial” sector (which produces partially tradable goods).1 A notable exception is the
work of Helpman (1998) who substituted the agricultural sector by a perfectly competitive
non-tradable goods sector (housing). Assuming that the location of this sector is exogenous,
Helpman showed that housing acts as a dispersion force, by increasing the cost-of-living in
a more populated region.
This result also appears in the economic geography model developed by Pflu¨ger and Su¨dekum
(2008), in which agents are assumed to have a logarithmic quasi-linear utility function and
housing costs act in the spirit of Helpman (1998). They show that, starting from a situation
of dispersion of industrial activity, falling trade costs lead to agglomeration. However, when
trade costs become sufficiently low, the relative importance of housing prices dominates the
agglomeration forces, and dispersion occurs again. Contrasting with most new economic
geography models, which feature ‘bang-bang’ phenomena (either symmetric dispersion or
full agglomeration of the industrial activity in one of two regions), their model can generate
partial agglomeration.
In the model of Behrens (2004), the absence of interregional trade is an endogenous outcome.
Firms want to sell in the locations that allow them to make a positive profit. Depending
on the level of trade costs and on the degree of competition, each good may be effectively
traded in equilibrium or not. Behrens (2004) shows that when the trade costs are higher than
a threshold value, all the industrial goods are non-tradable. In such an environment, the
economy comprises only an agricultural (traditional) sector and a non-tradable goods sector.
For this particular case, Behrens (2004) also shows that full and partial agglomeration in the
1See, for example, the works of Puga (1999), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (2001), Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003) and Baldwin et al. (2003).
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non-tradable sector arises in a completely autarchic world, and the structure of the spatial
economy is determined by the ratio of the mobile to immobile factor.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no model that explains the spatial distribution of
the production of both tradable and non-tradable goods. In order to fill this gap, this
paper generalizes the analytically solvable core-periphery model of Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003) by considering a third sector, which produces non-tradable goods (services). Like
the industrial sector, this service sector is assumed to be monopolistically competitive and
mobile across regions.
Workers and firms operating in the industrial and service sectors move to the region with
the highest utility level, until a spatial equilibrium is reached. We find that the resulting
configuration may consist in full agglomeration, symmetric dispersion, or a combination of
full agglomeration of industry with partial agglomeration of the service sector.
A strong preference for variety in the service sector is a very strong agglomeration force. For
any value of the trade costs, full agglomeration of industry and services in one region is an
equilibrium whenever the elasticity of substitution among services is lower than a threshold
value.
If the preference for variety of services is relatively weak, trade costs become crucial to
explain the location of the economic activity. If trade costs are high, the industry and
services become symmetrically dispersed across regions. If trade costs are low, then the
industry becomes agglomerated in one region, while the services become only partially
agglomerated. In this case, the region where all the industrial activity takes place will have
more than one-half of the service sector activity.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic setup
The model is an extension of the analytically solvable core-periphery model of Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003) that incorporates a third sector of services (non-tradable goods).2
2It is straightforward to verify that by considering that the size of the service sector in null (µs = 0), we
obtain the model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
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The economy comprises two regions and three sectors: an agricultural sector (perfectly
tradable goods), an industrial sector (partially tradable goods) and a service sector (non-
tradable goods). There are three factors of production: unskilled workers (L), industrial
sector workers (M) and service sector workers (S). The unskilled workers are immobile
across regions, while the industrial and service workers are mobile.
We denote by M1 and M2, with M1 +M2 = M , the supply of industrial workers in regions
1 and 2, respectively, and by S1 and S2, with S1 + S2 = S, the supply of service workers in
regions 1 and 2, respectively. The supply of unskilled workers is the same in each region,
L1 = L2 = L/2, and the total population is normalized to unity, L+M + S = 1.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous good under
constant returns to scale using only unskilled labor. Transportation of agricultural output
across regions is costless. The industrial sector and the service sector produce a horizontally
differentiated product using sector-specific labor (fixed cost) and unskilled labor (variable
cost).
Transportation of industrial goods and services is subject to iceberg transportation costs.
For each unit of industrial good that is shipped to the other region, only a fraction τm ∈ (0, 1)
arrives. The trade of services across regions is more costly: only a fraction τs ∈ [0, τm]
arrives. We will give particular attention to the case in which services are non-tradable
across regions (τs = 0).
All the agents have the same preferences for consumption of industrial goods (CM), services
(CS) and agricultural goods (CA). A natural extension of the utility function used by
Krugman (1991) and by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) to an economy with three sectors is
the following:
U = CµmM C
µs
S C
1−µm−µs
A , (1)
CM =
(
nm∑
i=1
c
σm−1
σm
mi
) σm
σm−1
, (2)
CS =
(
ns∑
i=1
c
σs−1
σs
si
) σs
σs−1
, (3)
where µm ∈ (0, 1) and µs ∈ (0, 1), with µm+µs < 1, are the shares of spending on industrial
products and on services; nm and ns are the number of varieties of industrial goods and of
services; cmi and csj are the consumption of the industrial good produced by firm i and of
the service provided by the firm j; and, finally, σm > 1 and σs > 1 are the elasticities of
substitution among industrial goods and among services.
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2.2 Supply
2.2.1 Agricultural sector
In the agricultural sector, firms use unskilled labor to produce a homogeneous good under
constant returns to scale. The production function is qA = L, where qA is the amount of
agricultural goods produced and L is the quantity of unskilled labor employed. The cost
function is CTA = Waq
A, where Wa is the nominal wage of the unskilled workers employed.
The profit function is:
ΠA = (pa −Wa)qA,
where pa is the price of an agricultural good, taken as given by the firms (perfect competition)
and chosen to be the numeraire (pa = 1).
The sector is perfectly competitive, therefore: Wa = pa = 1.
2.2.2 Industrial sector
Firms in the industrial sector support a fixed cost of αm units of industrial labor, and a
variable cost of β units of unskilled labor per unit of good produced. Since Wa = 1, the cost
function is CTM = αmWm + βq
M , where qM is the quantity of industrial goods produced
by an industrial firm and Wm is the nominal wage of the industrial workers employed by
the firm. The profit function is:
ΠM = pM(qM)qM − βqM − αmWm. (4)
Firms choose qM to maximize profit. This implies that:
pM =

− 1β,
where  is the price-elasticity of demand.
Since there is a large number of firms in the industrial sector,  ≈ σm (we have equality if
there is a continuum of firms). Thus:3
pM =
σm
σm − 1β. (5)
3In the case of Cournot competition: 1 =
1
σm
+ s(1 − 1σm ), where s is the market share of each firm.
With many firms in the economy (s ≈ 0), the price elasticity of demand, , is approximately equal to the
elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods, σm.
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Given the assumption of free entry, the profit of each firm must be zero. Substituting (5)
in (4), we obtain:
qM =
αm
β
(σm − 1)Wm (6)
Since an industrial firm employs αm units of skilled labor, the total demand for skilled labor
is nmαm. Therefore, the number of firms must be:
nm =
M
αm
. (7)
2.2.3 Service sector
Firms in the service sector use αs units of service workers as a fixed cost, and β units of
unskilled labor per unit of product.
As in the industrial sector, the price chosen by each firm is:
pS =
σs
σs − 1β.
The quantity produced by each firm is:
qS =
αs
β
(σs − 1)Ws, (8)
where Ws is the nominal wage of the service workers employed by the firm.
And the number of firms is:
ns =
S
αs
. (9)
2.3 Demand
2.3.1 Industrial sector
Individual demand for each industrial variety is obtained from utility maximization (2) with
respect to cmj . It can be shown that (Baldwin et al., 2003, pp. 38-39):
cmj = p
−σm
j
µmy∑nm
i=1 p
1−σm
i
,
6
where y is the income of the agent.
The industrial price index can be defined as:
Pm =
(
nm∑
i=1
pi
1−σm
) 1
1−σm
(10)
Using (10), the individual demand for the industrial variety j becomes:
cmj =
p−σmj
P 1−σmm
µmy. (11)
Each firm sells its products in both regions. The price of a representative local industrial
good is pii =
σm
σm−1β, and the price of a product that is exported from region i to region j is
pij = τ
−1
m
σm
σm−1β.
Since all manufacturing firms of a region set the same price, the industrial price index in
region i is:
Pmi =
(
nmipii
1−σm + nmjpij1−σm
) 1
1−σm =
=
βσm
σm − 1
(
nmi + nmjτ
σm−1
m
) 1
1−σm , (12)
where nmi and nmj are the number of industrial firms in regions i and j, respectively.
Defining φm = τ
σm−1
m as the degree of economic integration for the industrial sector (Baldwin
et al., 2003), we obtain:
Pmi =
βσm
σm − 1 (nmi + nmjφm)
1
1−σm . (13)
Denoting the total demand of an industrial product that is produced in region i and con-
sumed in region j by Cmij , we have:
Cmii =
p−σmii
P 1−σmmi
µmYi and Cmij =
p−σmij
P 1−σmmj
µmYj,
where Yi and Yj are the nominal incomes in regions i and j, respectively.
Since pii =
βσm
σm−1 and pij = τ
−1
m
βσm
σm−1 , the above equations become:
Cmii =
(
βσm
σm−1
)−σm
P 1−σmmi
µmYi and Cmij =
τσmm
(
βσm
σm−1
)−σm
P 1−σmmj
µmYj. (14)
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Denoting the output of an industrial firm in region i by qmi, we have:
qmi = Cmii + τ
−1
m Cmij . (15)
Substituting (14) in (15), we obtain:
qmi = µm
(
βσm
σm − 1
)−σm ( Yi
P 1−σmmi
+
τσm−1m Yj
P 1−σmmj
)
. (16)
Replacing (13) in (16):
qmi = µm
σm − 1
βσm
(
Yi
nmi + φmnmj
+
φmYj
φmnmi + nmj
)
.
Substituting (6) and (7) above, we obtain the nominal wage of the skilled workers in each
region:
Wmi =
µm
σm
(
Yi
Mi + φmMj
+
φmYj
φmMi +Mj
)
. (17)
2.3.2 Service sector
All the expressions obtained in the previous subsection apply.
The individual demand for a service, csj , is:
csj =
p−σssj
P 1−σss
µsy, (18)
where Ps =
(
ns∑
i=1
pi
1−σs
) 1
1−σs
.
The internal and external demand for a service produced in region i are:
Csii =
(
βσs
σs−1
)−σs
P 1−σssi
µsYi and Csij =
τσss
(
βσs
σs−1
)−σs
P 1−σssj
µsYj. (19)
The output of a service provider in region i is:
qsi = µs
(
βσs
σs − 1
)−σs ( Yi
P 1−σssi
+
φsYj
P 1−σssj
)
, for i, j = 1, 2, (20)
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where φs = τ
σs−1
s is the degree of economic integration in the service sector.
The price index of services in region i is:
Psi =
βσs
σs − 1 (nsi + nsjφs)
1
1−σs , for i, j = 1, 2, (21)
where nsi and nsj are the number of service providers in region i and j, respectively.
The nominal wage of the skilled workers in the service sector in region i is:
Wsi =
µs
σs
(
Yi
Si + φsSj
+
φsYj
φsSi + Sj
)
, for i, j = 1, 2. (22)
2.3.3 Regional income, perfect price index
The nominal income in region i, is equal to the sum of the incomes in the agricultural,
industrial and service sector:
Yi =
1−M − S
2
+WmiMi +WsiSi, for i = 1, 2. (23)
The perfect price index of region, Pi, aggregates three price indices: the price index of the
agricultural sector (normalized to 1), the price index of the industrial sector, Pmi, and the
price index of the service sector, Psi.
We obtain the price index of industrial goods in region i, by substituting (7) into (13):
Pmi =
βσm
σm − 1
(
Mi
αm
+
φmMj
αm
) 1
1−σm
, for i, j = 1, 2.
Denote the share of industrial workers in region 1 by fm =
M1
M
. Substituting above:
Pm1 =
βσm
σm − 1
(
M
αm
) 1
1−σm
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
1
1−σm ,
and
Pm2 =
βσm
σm − 1
(
M
αm
) 1
1−σm
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
1
1−σm .
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Substituting (9) into (21), and defining fs =
S1
S
as the share of service sector workers in
region 1, we obtain:
Ps1 =
βσs
σs − 1
(
S
αs
) 1
1−σs
[fs + (1− fs)φs]
1
1−σs ,
and
Ps2 =
βσs
σs − 1
(
S
αs
) 1
1−σs
[φsfs + (1− fs)]
1
1−σs .
Using the last four expressions, we obtain the perfect price indices for each region:
P1 = ρ [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm [fs + (1− fs)φs]
µs
1−σs , (24)
and
P2 = ρ [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm [φsfs + (1− fs)]
µs
1−σs , (25)
where ρ =
(
βσm
σm − 1
)µm ( βσs
σs − 1
)µs (M
αm
) µm
1−σm
(
S
αs
) µs
1−σs
.
2.4 Short-run equilibrium
In the short-run, workers are immobile across regions. A short-run equilibrium consists in
the equality of supply and demand. Aggregate prices, output and wages are endogenously
determined.
Equations (17), (22), (23), (24) and (25) determine the short-run equilibrium of the model.
We recall these equations:
Wm1 =
µm
σm
(
Y1
M1 + φmM2
+
φmY2
φmM1 +M2
)
,
Wm2 =
µm
σm
(
Y2
M2 + φmM1
+
φmY1
φmM2 +M1
)
,
Ws1 =
µs
σs
(
Y1
S1 + φsS2
+
φsY2
φsS1 + S2
)
,
Ws2 =
µs
σs
(
Y2
S2 + φsS1
+
φsY1
φsS2 + S1
)
,
Y1 =
1−M − S
2
+Wm1M1 +Ws1S1,
Y2 =
1−M − S
2
+Wm2M2 +Ws2S2,
P1 = ρ [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm [fs + (1− fs)φs]
µs
1−σs ,
P2 = ρ [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm [φsfs + (1− fs)]
µs
1−σs .
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Solving these equations, we find the nominal wages of the workers in each region:4
Wm1 = Cσm2φmM1
[
σs − µs S1S2 (1− φ
2
s)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs (S
2
1 + S
2
2)
]
+
+ CσmM2
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
φ2m
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
+
S2 − φsS1
φsS1 + S2
)}
,
Wm2 = Cσm2φmM2
[
σs − µs S1S2 (1− φ
2
s)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs (S
2
1 + S
2
2)
]
+
+ CσmM1
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
φ2m
S2 − φsS1
φsS1 + S2
+
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
)}
,
Ws1 = Dσs2φsS1
[
σm − µm M1M2 (1− φ
2
m)
M1M2 (1 + φ2m) + φm (M
2
1 +M
2
2 )
]
+
+ DσsS2
{
σm
[
φ2s + 1 +
µs
σs
(φ2s − 1)
]
− µm
(
φ2s
M1 − φmM2
M1 + φmM2
+
M2 − φmM1
φmM1 +M2
)}
,
Ws2 = Dσs2φsS2
[
σm − µm M1M2 (1− φ
2
m)
M1M2 (1 + φ2m) + φm (M
2
1 +M
2
2 )
]
+
+ DσsS1
{
σm
[
φ2s + 1 +
µs
σs
(φ2s − 1)
]
− µm
(
φ2s
M2 −M1φm
φmM1 +M2
+
M1 − φmM2
M1 + φmM2
)}
,
where
C =
µmσs
1−M−S
2
(S1 + φsS2)(φsS1 + S2)
R
,
D =
µsσm
1−M−S
2
(M1 + φmM2)(φmM1 +M2)
R
,
and
R = {σm (M1 + φmM2) [σs (S1 + φsS2)− S1µs]−M1µmσs (S1 + φsS2)} ×
× {σm (φmM1 +M2) [σs (φsS1 + S2)− S2µs]−M2µmσs (φsS1 + S2)} −
− [M1µmφmσs (φsS1 + S2) + S1µsφsσm (φmM1 +M2)]×
× [M2µmφmσs (S1 + φsS2) + S2µsφsσm (M1 + φmM2)] .
The real wages of the industrial sector workers in regions 1 and 2 are ωm1 =
Wm1
P1
and
ωm2 =
Wm2
P2
, and the real wages of the service sector workers in regions 1 and 2 are ωs1 =
Ws1
P1
and ωs2 =
Ws2
P2
.
4See Appendix 7.1 for detailed calculations.
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2.5 Long-run equilibrium
In the long-run, the skilled workers of the industrial and service sectors choose their location
with the objective of maximizing their utility (equivalently, they move to the region with
the highest real wage).
Migration is assumed to be determined by the following processes:
f˙m =
dfm
dt
=

ωm1(fs, fm)− ωm2(fs, fm), if 0 < fm < 1
min {0, ωm1(fs, fm)− ωm2(fs, fm)} , if fm = 1
max {0, ωm1(fs, fm)− ωm2(fs, fm)} , if fm = 0
and
f˙s =
dfs
dt
=

ωs1(fs, fm)− ωs2(fs, fm), if 0 < fs < 1
min {0, ωs1(fs, fm)− ωs2(fs, fm)} , if fs = 1
max {0, ωs1(fs, fm)− ωs2(fs, fm)} , if fs = 0,
where fs and fm are functions of time, t, which is left implicit to simplify notation. The
derivatives of fs and fm with respect to t are denoted by f˙s and f˙m, respectively.
A distribution of economic activity, (f ∗s , f
∗
m), is a steady-state if and only if f˙m = f˙s = 0 at
(f ∗s , f
∗
m). A long-run equilibrium is a stable steady-state.
The sufficient conditions for stability are the following:
(i) f ∗x = 0 ⇒ (ωx1 − ωx2) |(f∗s ,f∗m) < 0, for x ∈ {s,m};
(ii) f ∗x = 1 ⇒ (ωx1 − ωx2) |(f∗s ,f∗m) > 0, for x ∈ {s,m};
(iii) f ∗x ∈ (0, 1) ∧ f ∗y ∈ {0, 1} ⇒ ∂(ωx1−ωx2)∂fx |(f∗s ,f∗m) < 0, for (x, y) ∈ {(s,m), (m, s)};
(iv) (f ∗s , f
∗
m) ∈ (0, 1)2 ⇒ det(J)|(f∗s ,f∗m) > 0 and tr(J)|(f∗s ,f∗m) < 0, where:
J =
[
∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂fm
∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂fs
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fm
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fs
]
.
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3 The case in which services are non-tradable
In this section, we study the case in which services are asymptotically non-tradable (τs → 0
and, thus, φs → 0).5 This is the case for most services related to arts, entertainment, real
estate, rental, wholesale trade, education and health services.
3.1 Short-run equilibrium
We start by computing, for each sector, the difference between the real wages of the skilled
workers in region 1 and region 2 (see Appendix 7.2). We obtain:
ωm1 − ωm2 = µmK
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
× (ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) (26)
and
ωs1 − ωs2 =
µsK
{
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
+ fm (1− fm) (1 + φ2m)
}{
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
} (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2) ,
(27)
where:
K1 = σm (σs − µs) [σm (σs − µs)− σsµm] ,
K2 = σm (σs − µs)
[
σm (σs − µs)
(
1 + φ2m
)− 2µmσs]+ µ2mσ2s (1− φ2m) ,
K =
σ1−µmm σ
1−µs
s (1−M − S) (σm − 1)µm (σs − 1)µs
2α
µm
σm−1
m α
µs
σs−1
s βµm+µsM
1− µm
σm−1S−
µs
σs−1
,
ω¯m1 =
2φmfm (σs − µs) + (1− fm)
[
σs(φ
2
m + 1) +
σsµm
σm
(φ2m − 1)− µs (φ2m + 1)
]
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
µs
1−σs
s
,
ω¯m2 =
2φm(1− fm) (σs − µs) + fm
[
σs(φ
2
m + 1) +
σsµm
σm
(φ2m − 1)− µs (φ2m + 1)
]
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
,
ω¯s1 =
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µm 1−fm(1+φm)1−fm(1−φm)
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
,
ω¯s2 =
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µmfm(1+φm)−φmfm(1−φm)+φm
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
.
5We do not consider the limit case because, with τs = 0, the demand of the agricultural workers is inde-
terminate when services are concentrated in the other region. When restricted to CS = 0, the agricultural
workers are indifferent between any attainable consumption vector.
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3.2 Long-run equilibrium
In this section, we study the long-run equilibrium of the model. The following are possible
spatial equilibrium configurations:
(i) concentration of industry and services in the same region;
(ii) concentration of industry in one region with asymmetric dispersion of services;
(iii) symmetric dispersion of industry and services.
Figure 1: Possible equilibrium configurations
Figure 1 illustrates the possible equilibrium solutions. In the vertical axis we have the share
of industrial workers in region 1 and in the horizontal axis we have the share of service
workers in region 1. The possible equilibrium solutions are signalled by black dots. The
black crosses signal configurations which are never an equilibrium.
3.2.1 Concentration of industry and services in the same region
Concentration of the industrial and service activity in region 1, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (1, 1), is a steady-
state if: {
(ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(1,1) ≥ 0
(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(1,1) ≥ 0,
14
and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if there exists an  > 0 such that,
∀(fs, fm) ∈ (1− , 1]2: {
(ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm) ≥ 0,
(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm) ≥ 0.
Similarly, concentration of the industrial and service activity in region 2, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (0, 0),
is a steady-state if: {
(ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(0,0) ≤ 0
(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(0,0) ≤ 0,
and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if there exists an  > 0 such that,
∀(fs, fm) ∈ [0, )2: {
(ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm) ≤ 0,
(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm) ≤ 0.
Figure 2: Concentration of industry. Figure 3: Concentration of services.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the existence of full agglomeration of the industrial and service
activity in one region, when σs ≤ µs + 1.6
In figure 2, we assume that all the services are concentrated in region 1, fs = 1, and we study
the relationship between the spatial distribution of industry and the difference between the
real wages of the industrial workers across regions. We find that the real wage is always
higher in region 1. Thus, all industrial workers migrate to region 1.
In figure 3, we assume that all the industry is concentrated in region 1, fm = 1, and we
study how the spatial distribution of services affects the difference between the real wages
6To plot these figures, we have set τm = 0.5, µm = 0.4, σm = 4, µs = 0.4 and σs = 1.3.
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of the service sector workers across regions. We find that if the service sector activity in
region 1 is high enough, the service sector workers obtain a higher real wage in region 1.
We conclude that full agglomeration of industry and services is an equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1. Concentration of both sectors in a single region is an equilibrium if and only
if σs ≤ µs + 1.
This result (which is proved in Appendix 7.3) shows that trade costs in the industrial sector
are irrelevant to explain concentration of industry and services activity in a single region,
when the degree of differentiation in the service sector is high and services are non-tradable.
For any value of the trade costs in the industrial sector, a high preference for variety of
services is a sufficient condition to induce full concentration of industry and services. Under
this condition, even if industrial goods are perfectly tradable, all the industrial firms locate
their production in the same region. This contrasts with the results obtained in the classical
model.
From now on, we will frequently assume that σs > µs + 1 (no black-hole condition).
3.2.2 Concentration of industry and asymmetric dispersion of services
Concentration of industrial activity in region 1 with asymmetric dispersion of the service
activity, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (s, 1), with s ∈ (0.5, 1), is a steady-state if:{
(ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(s,1) ≥ 0
(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(s,1) = 0,
and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if there exists an  > 0 such that,
∀(fs, fm) ∈ (s− , s+ )× (1− , 1]: (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm) ≥ 0∂(ωs1−ωs2)∂fs ∣∣∣(fs,fm) < 0
Similarly, concentration of industrial activity in region 2 with asymmetric dispersion of the
service activity, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (s, 0), with s ∈ (0, 0.5), is a steady-state if:{
(ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(s,0) ≤ 0
(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(s,0) = 0,
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and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if there exists an  > 0 such that,
∀(fs, fm) ∈ (s− , s+ )× [0, ): (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm) ≤ 0∂(ωs1−ωs2)∂fs ∣∣∣(fs,fm) < 0
Figure 4: Concentration of industry. Figure 5: Asymmetric dispersion of services.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate an equilibrium with full concentration of industry and asymmetric
dispersion of services.7
With fs = 0.586, we can see from figure 4 that the real wage of the industrial workers is
always higher in region 1. Thus, industrial workers locate in region 1.
In figure 5, we assume that all the industrial activity is concentrated in region 1, fm = 1,
and study how the spatial distribution of the service sector activity affects the difference
between the real wages of the service sector workers across regions. The migration of the
service sector workers leads to an equilibrium with fs = 0.586, as the real wages of the
service sector workers coincide.
We conclude that the concentration of industry in region 1 and the asymmetric dispersion
of services (58.6% in region 1) constitutes an equilibrium.
The following lemma describes the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which
the industry is concentrated while the service sector is asymmetrically dispersed.
7To plot these figures, we have set τm = 0.825, µm = 0.4, σm = 4, µs = 0.4 and σs = 4. We have also
set fs = 0.586 in figure 4 and fm = 1 in figure 5.
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Lemma 3.2. Concentration of industrial activity in region 1 or 2 and asymmetric dispersion
of the service activity is an equilibrium if σs > µs + 1 and:[
σm(1−µsσs )−µm
σm(1−µsσs )+µm
] µs
µs+1−σs
φ
1− µm(σs−1)
(σm−1)(σs−1−µs)
m − φ
2
m[σs(1+µmσm )−µs]+σs(1−
µs
σm
)−µs
2(σs−µs) > 0.
To prove lemma 3.2, we use the following result. It states that when the elasticity of
substitution of services is high enough to satisfy what we may call the black-hole condition,
then a movement of service workers to a region decreases the attractiveness of this region
to the service workers.
Lemma 3.3. When σs > µs + 1, an increase in the share of services in region 1 (fs)
decreases the difference between the real wages in the service sector (ωs1 − ωs2).
3.2.3 Symmetric dispersion of industry and services
Symmetric dispersion of the industrial activity and service activity, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (0.5, 0.5), is
a steady-state if: {
(ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(0.5,0.5) = 0
(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(0.5,0.5) = 0,
and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if det(J)|(fs,fm)=(0.5,0.5) > 0 and
tr(J)|(fs,fm)=(0.5,0.5) < 0, where J is the Jacobian matrix of the model described by expres-
sions (26) and (27):
J =
[
∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂fm
∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂fs
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fm
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fs
]
.
The following result implies that all these derivatives are well defined.
Claim 3.4. The differences ωm1 − ωm2 and ωs1 − ωs2 are continuous and differentiable
functions of fm and fs, for (fs, fm) ∈ (0, 1)2.
Symmetric dispersion is always a steady-state.
Lemma 3.5. When (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), the real wages in the industrial sector and in the
service sector are equal across regions (ωm1 = ωm2 and ωs1 = ωs2).
We already know that ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fs
< 0. Calculating the remaining elements of the Jacobian
matrix, we obtain the following results.
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Lemma 3.6. When (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), the migration of service sector workers to region
1 increases the difference between the real wages of the industrial sector workers in region 1
and region 2, that is, ∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂fs
> 0.
Lemma 3.7. When (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), the migration of industrial sector workers to region
1 increases the difference between the real wages of the service sector workers in region 1
and region 2, that is, ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fm
> 0.
These lemmas are important to explain the stability of the dispersion configuration and the
following figures are useful for an intuitive understanding of the dynamics.8
Figure 6: Dispersion of industry. Figure 7: Dispersion of services.
Assume that the economy is initially located in point A, with (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5). We
have ωm1 = ωm2 (figure 6) and ωs1 = ωs2 (figure 7). Consider an increase in the number
of industrial workers in region 1, to fm = 0.8 (point B). From Lemma 3.7, an increase in
fm increases ωs1 − ωs2, and thus the curve in figure 7 moves up. The service sector workers
would tend to move to region 1, until fs = 0, 56. On the other hand, with fs = 0.56, the
curve in figure 6 moves up, and the industrial workers would also migrate, until fm = 0.52.
With fm = 0.52, the resulting fs would be lower than 0.56, giving rise to a new fm, lower
than 0.52. It seems that this process continues until (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), suggesting that
symmetric dispersion is an equilibrium.
We can see from figure 8 that dispersion is unstable when τm = 0.9.
9 An increase in fm
increases the difference between the real wages of the industrial workers in region 1 and
8To plot figures 6 and 7, we have set µm = 0.4 σm = 4, µs = 0.4, σs = 4 and τm = 0.5.
9To plot figures 8 and 9, we have set µm = 0.4 σm = 4, µs = 0.4, σs = 4 and τm = 0.9. Additionally, we
have set fs = 0.5 to plot figure 8 and fm = 1 to plot figure 9.
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Figure 8: Dispersion becomes unstable. Figure 9: Asymmetric Dispersion.
region 2, attracting workers from region 2 to region 1. From lemma 3.7, an increase in
fm also increases the difference between the real wages in the service sector Therefore, in
the long-run, we will have an asymmetric dispersion of the service sector activity and full
concentration of the industrial activity.
In Appendix 7.3 we calculate the Jacobian matrix. Here, we compute det(J) and tr(J)
using a numerical example. Figure 10 illustrates a case in which symmetric dispersion of
the industrial and service activity is an equilibrium for low values of φm.
10
For the parameter values in our numerical example, tr(J) is negative for any φm ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, the sign of the determinant is crucial for the stability. From figure 10, we can
see that det(J) is positive for low values of φm. This means that the eigenvalues of J have
negative real parts and symmetric dispersion of industry and services is an equilibrium.
For high values of φm, the symmetric dispersion becomes unstable. In this case, asymmetric
dispersion of the service activity with full concentration of the industrial activity in one
region becomes the equilibrium.
This result can be viewed in figure 11, where we also plot the “asymmetric condition” (49)
as a function of φm. When φm is higher than φ
∗
m, concentration of all industrial activity
in one region with asymmetric dispersion of the service activity becomes an equilibrium.
Therefore, point A is a threshold value for φm.
In particular, when σs > µs + 1, the economy can have two distinct equilibrium configu-
rations. For high trade costs (low φm), we find that symmetric dispersion of services and
10In figures 10 and 11, it is also assumed that σm = 4, σs = 4, µm = 0.4 and µs = 4.
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Figure 10: Det(J) as a function of φm. Figure 11: Threshold value for φm.
industry is an equilibrium, while for low trade costs (high φm), we find that concentration
of industry with asymmetric dispersion of services is an equilibrium.
3.2.4 Configurations which are never an equilibrium
We also show that the following configurations are never an equilibrium:
(i) concentration of services and concentration of industry in different regions;
(ii) symmetric dispersion of services and concentration of industry;
(iii) concentration of services together with dispersion of industry.
Lemma 3.8. Concentration of each sector in different regions is never an equilibrium.
Lemma 3.9. Symmetric dispersion of services and concentration of industry is never an
equilibrium.
Lemma 3.10. Concentration of services together with dispersion of industry is never an
equilibrium.
4 The case in which services are tradable
In this section we show, numerically, that a different spatial configuration of economic
activity, concentration of services with dispersion of industry, can appear when services are
tradable (0 < φs ≤ φm < 1).
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Consider an initial equilibrium, in which both industry and services are concentrated in
region 1. Figure 12 illustrates how an decrease in the trade cost of services (an increase in
τs) affects the spatial distribution of industry, when all services are concentrated in region 1
(point A). The main result is that a fall in the trade cost of services leads to an equilibrium
in which industry becomes asymmetric dispersed (point C), while the service sector remains
concentrated in region 1 (see figure 13).11
Figure 12: Industry becomes dispersed. Figure 13: Concentration of services.
The same decrease in the trade cost of services (from τs → 0 to τs = 0.4) may not change
the initial equilibrium configuration, being compatible with symmetric dispersion of both
sectors (set τm = 0.5, keeping fixed the remaining parameters) or asymmetric dispersion of
services with full concentration of industry (set τm = 0.825).
5 Conclusion
We have extended the footloose entrepreneur model (Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003) to allow
for a third sector: a monopolistic competitive sector of services, assumed to be non-tradable
across regions.
We find that the strength of the preference for variety of services is crucial to explain the
spatial distribution of the industrial and service activity. When the elasticity of substitution
among services is below a certain threshold, full concentration of industry and services in
11To plot figures 12 and 13, we have set τm = 0.5, µm = 0.4 σm = 4, µs = 0.4, σs = 1.3. We also set
fs = 1 in figure 12 and fm = 1 in figure 13.
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a single region is always an equilibrium. But this threshold value for the elasticity of
substitution among services seems a bit too low to be attainable in modern economies, as
it corresponds to a very high price markup over marginal cost.12 Based on this model, we
should not expect, therefore, full concentration of industry and services in a single region.
With a higher elasticity of substitution among services, which is more likely, the spatial
distribution of economic activity depends on the trade costs in the industrial sector. If
these trade costs are high, symmetric dispersion of the services and industrial activity is
an equilibrium. If they are low, concentration of industry with asymmetric dispersion of
services is an equilibrium (in this case, the industrialized region has more than 50% of the
service sector activity).
Taking into account the existence of non-tradable goods, with specialized workers which are
mobile across regions, should provide new insights about the determinants of the spatial
organization of economic activity. We hope that this model may be seen as a step in this
direction.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Short-run equilibrium
The nominal wages of the industrial and service sector workers are:
Wmi =
µm
σm
(
Yi
Mi + φmMj
+
Yjφm
φmMi +Mj
)
, (28)
Wsi =
µs
σs
(
Yi
Si + φsSj
+
Yjφs
φsSi + Sj
)
. (29)
The regional nominal incomes are:
Yi =
1−H − S
2
+WmiMi +WsiSi. (30)
Our goal in this section is to find Wmi and Wsi as functions of the parameters of the model.
First, we determine Yi and Yj. Then, we substitute these into Wmi and Wsi.
Substituting (28) and (29) in (30), and using a = 1−H−S
2
, we obtain:
Yi = a+Mi
µm
σm
(
Yi
Mi + φmMj
+
Yjφm
φmMi +Mj
)
+ Si
µs
σs
(
Yi
Si + φsSj
+
Yjφs
φsSi + Sj
)
.
Rearranging, we obtain Yi as a function of Yj:
Yi
[
1− µmMi
σm (Mi + φmMj)
− µsSi
σs (Si + φsSj)
]
=
= a+
[
µmMiφm
σm (φmMi +Mj)
+
µsSiφs
σs (φsSi + Sj)
]
Yj.
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For convenience, define:
bm = φmMi +Mj,
cm = Mi + φmMj,
bs = φsSi + Sj,
cs = Si + φsSj.
With some manipulation, we obtain:
Yi
σmcmσscs − µmMiσscs − µsSiσmcm
σmcmσscs
= a+
µmMiφmσsbs + µsSiφsσmbm
σsbsσmbm
Yj.
Which is equivalent to:
Yi =
aσmσscmcs + (µmMiφmσsbs + Siµsφsσmbm) cmcsb
−1
m b
−1
s Yj
σmcm (σscs − Siµs)−Miµmσscs . (31)
The above equation yields Yi as a function of Yj. By symmetry, we can write Yj as function
of Yi as follows:
Yj =
aσmσsbmbs + (µmMjφmσscs + Sjµsφsσmcm) bmbsc
−1
m c
−1
s Yi
σmbm (σsbs − Sjµs)−Mjµmσsbs . (32)
Substituting (32) in (31) and simplifying, we obtain:
Yi =
cmcs [σmbm (σsbs − Sjµs)−Mjµmσsbs +Miµmφmσsbs + Siµsφsσmbm]
a−1σ−1m σ−1s R
, (33)
and, by symmetry:
Yj =
bmbs [σmcm (σscs − Siµs)−Miµmσscs +Mjµmφmσscs + Sjµsφsσmcm]
a−1σ−1m σ−1s R
, (34)
where:
R = [σmcm (σscs − Siµs)−Miµmσscs] [σmbm (σsbs − Sjµs)−Mjµmσsbs]−
− (Miµmφmσsbs + Siµsφsσmbm) (Mjµmφmσscs + Sjµsφsσmcm) .
Denoting by Y Ni and Y
N
j the numerators of Yi and Yj in equations (33) and (34), we can
rewrite (28) in the following way:
Wmi =
µmσsa
cmbmR
(
Y Ni bm + φmY
N
j cm
)
.
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Replacing the expressions for Yi and Yj, and setting i = 1 and j = 2, we obtain:
Wm1 =
µmaσmσs
R
[ csbm (σsbs − S2µs)−M2csσ−1m µmσsbs +M1csσ−1m µmφmσsbs +
+ S1µsφscsbm + φmbscm (σscs − S1µs)−M1φmbsµmσsσ−1m cs +
+ M2φ
2
mbsµmσsσ
−1
m cs + S2φmbsµsφscm ] .
Denoting C = µmcsbsσsa
R
, and replacing bm, cm, bs and cs by the corresponding expressions:
Wm1
C
= σm (φmM1 +M2)
(
σs − µsS2 − φsS1
S2 + φsS1
)
+ µmσs (φmM1 −M2) +
+ φm
[
σm (M1 + φmM2)
(
σs − µsS1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
)
+ µmσs(φmM2 −M1)
]
.
Manipulating:
Wm1
C
= φmσmM1
[
2σs − µs
(
S2 − φsS1
S2 + φsS1
+
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
)]
+
+M2
[
σmσs
(
φ2m + 1
)
+ σsµm
(
φ2m − 1
)− σmµs(φ2mS1 − φsS2S1 + φsS2 + S2 − φsS1S2 + φsS1
)]
.
It is easy to show that:
S2 − φsS1
φsS1 + S2
+
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
=
2S1S2 (1− φ2s)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs (S
2
1 + S
2
2)
.
Substituting this expression, we determine Wm1 and (by symmetry) Wm2:
Wm1
Cσm
= 2φmM1
[
σs − µs S1S2 (1− φ
2
s)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs (S
2
1 + S
2
2)
]
+
+M2
[
σs
(
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
φ2m −
µm
σm
)
− µs
(
φ2m
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
+
S2 − φsS1
S2 + φsS1
)]
(35)
and
Wm2
Cσm
= 2φmM2
[
σs − µs S1S2 (1− φ
2
s)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs (S
2
1 + S
2
2)
]
+
+M1
[
σs
(
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
φ2m −
µm
σm
)
− µs
(
φ2m
S2 − φsS1
S2 + φsS1
+
S1 − φsS2)
S1 + φsS2
)]
, (36)
where:
C =
µmcsbsσsa
R
=
µmσsa
R
(S1 + φsS2)(S2 + φsS1),
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and:
R = {σm (M1 + φmM2) [σs (S1 + φsS2)− S1µs]−M1µmσs (S1 + φsS2)} ×
× {σm (φmM1 +M2) [σs (φsS1 + S2)− S2µs]−M2µmσs (φsS1 + S2)} −
− [M1µmφmσs (φsS1 + S2) + S1µsφsσm (φmM1 +M2)]×
× [M2µmφmσs (S1 + φsS2) + S2µsφsσm (M1 + φmM2)] .
Equations (35) and (36) are explicit functions of the parameters of the model.
By analogy, we find the nominal wages in the service sector:
Ws1
Dσs
= 2φsS1
[
σm − µm M1M2 (1− φ
2
m)
M1M2 (1 + φ2m) + φm (M
2
1 +M
2
2 )
]
+
+ S2
[
σm
(
φ2s + 1 +
µs
σs
φ2s −
µs
σs
)
− µm
(
φ2s
M1 − φmM2
M1 + φmM2
+
M2 − φmM1
M2 + φmM1
)]
(37)
and
Ws2
Dσs
= 2φsS2
[
σm − µm M1M2 (1− φ
2
m)
M1M2 (1 + φ2m) + φm (M
2
1 +M
2
2 )
]
+
+ S1
[
σm
(
φ2s + 1 +
µs
σs
φ2s −
µs
σs
)
− µm
(
φ2s
M2 − φmM1
M2 + φmM1
+
M1 − φmM2)
M1 + φmM2
)]
, (38)
where:
D =
µscmbmσma
R
=
µsσma
R
(M1 + φmM2)(M2 + φmM1),
and:
R = {σm (M1 + φmM2) [σs (S1 + φsS2)− S1µs]−M1µmσs (S1 + φsS2)} ×
× {σm (φmM1 +M2) [σs (φsS1 + S2)− S2µs]−M2µmσs (φsS1 + S2)} −
− [M1µmφmσs (φsS1 + S2) + S1µsφsσm (φmM1 +M2)]×
× [M2µmφmσs (S1 + φsS2) + S2µsφsσm (M1 + φmM2)] .
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7.2 Short-run equilibrium with τs → 0
With τs → 0, equations (17), (22), (23), (24) and (25) become:
Wm1 =
µm
σmM
[
Y1
fm + φm(1− fm) +
φmY2
φmfm + 1− fm
]
Wm2 =
µm
σmM
[
Y2
1− fm + φmfm +
φmY1
φm(1− fm) + fm
]
Ws1 =
µsY1
σsSfs
Ws2 =
µsY2
σsS(1− fs)
Y1 =
1−M − S
2
+Wm1Mfm +Ws1Sfs
Y2 =
1−M − S
2
+Wm2M(1− fm) +Ws2S(1− fs)
P1 = ρ [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
µs
1−σs
s
P2 = ρ [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)
µs
1−σs .
From (35)-(38), we compute the nominal wages of the workers in each region:
Wm1
C0σm
= 2φmM1 (σs − µs) +M2
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
, (39)
Wm2
C0σm
= 2φmM2 (σs − µs) +M1
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
, (40)
Ws1
D0σs
= S2
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µmM2 − φmM1
φmM1 +M2
]
, (41)
Ws2
D0σs
= S1
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µmM1 − φmM2
M1 + φmM2
]
,
(42)
where
C0 =
µmS1S2
R0σm
,
D0 =
µs(M1 + φmM2)(φmM1 +M2)
R0σs
,
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and
R0 =
S1S2
aσmσs
{ [σm (M1 + φmM2) (σs − µs)−M1µmσs]×
× [σm (φmM1 +M2) (σs − µs)−M2µmσs]−M1M2µ2mφ2mσ2s } .
Dividing the nominal wage in the industrial sector (39) by the regional price level, we obtain
the real wages of the industrial workers:
ωm1 =
2φmfm (σs − µs) + (1− fm)
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs (1 + φ2m)
}
Rm [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
µs
1−σs
s
(43)
and
ωm2 =
2φm(1− fm) (σs − µs) + fm
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs (1 + φ2m)
}
Rm [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
, (44)
where
Rm =
ρM
aµmσmσs
{ {σm [fm + φm(1− fm)] (σs − µs)− fmµmσs} ×
× {σm [φmfm + (1− fm)] (σs − µs)− (1− fm)µmσs} − fm(1− fm)µ2mφ2mσ2s } .
With some manipulation, we find that the real wage differential in the industrial sector can
be written as:
ωm1 − ωm2 = µmK
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
× (ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) , (45)
where:
K =
σ1−µmm σ
1−µs
s (1−M − S) (σm − 1)µm (σs − 1)µs
2α
µm
σm−1
m α
µs
σs−1
s βµm+µsM
1− µm
σm−1S−
µs
σs−1
,
K1 = σm (σs − µs) [σm (σs − µs)− σsµm] ,
K2 = σm (σs − µs)
[
σm (σs − µs)
(
1 + φ2m
)− 2µmσs]+ µ2mσ2s (1− φ2m) ,
ω¯m1 =
2φmfm (σs − µs) + (1− fm)
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs (φ2m + 1)
}
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
µs
1−σs
s
,
ω¯m2 =
2φm(1− fm) (σs − µs) + fm
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs (φ2m + 1)
}
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
.
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Similarly, for the service sector, we obtain:
ωs1 =
[fm + φm(1− fm)] [φmfm + 1− fm]
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µm 1−fm−φmfm1−fm+φmfm
]
Rs [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
and:
ωs2 =
[fm + φm(1− fm)] [φmfm + 1− fm]
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µmfm−φm(1−fm)fm+φm(1−fm)
]
Rs [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
,
where
Rs =
ρS
aσmσs
{ [σm [fm + φm(1− fm)] (σs − µs)− fmµmσs]×
× [σm (φmfm + 1− fm) (σs − µs)− (1− fm)µmσs]− fm(1− fm)µ2mφ2mσ2s } .
Again, after some manipulation, we write the real wage differential in the service sector as:
ωs1 − ωs2 =
µsK
{
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
+ fm (1− fm) (1 + φ2m)
}
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
(ω¯s1 − ω¯s2) (46)
where:
ω¯s1 =
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µm 1−fm(1+φm)1−fm(1−φm)
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
;
ω¯s2 =
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µmfm(1+φm)−φmfm(1−φm)+φm
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
.
7.3 Long-run equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 3.1.
Since regions are symmetric, we only study concentration in region 1.
When the workers become concentrated in region 1, Rm converges to:
lim
fm→1−
Rm =
ρMφm
aµmσs
(σmσs − µsσm − µmσs) (σs − µs) > 0.
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Therefore, we have:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm1 =
2φm (σs − µs)
lim(fm,fs)→(1−,1−) Rm
=
2aµmσs
ρM (σmσs − σmµs − µmσs) .
While:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm2 =
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs (1 + φ2m)
lim(fm,fs)→(1−,1−) Rmφ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
.
The numerator is positive, while the denominator goes to infinity. Thus:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm2 = 0.
We conclude that the industrial workers remain concentrated, as:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm1 > lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm2.
In the service sector, real wages in region 1 tend to:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωs1 = lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
φm(1− fs)
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
+ µm
]
Rs
.
Notice that:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
Rs
φm(1− fs) =
ρS
aσs
(σmσs − σmµs − µmσs) (σs − µs) .
Therefore:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωs1 = lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
+ µm
ρS
aσs
(σmσs − σmµs − µmσs) (σs − µs)
> 0.
While:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωs2 =
φ
1−σm−µm
1−σm
m
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µm
]
lim(fm,fs)→(1−,1−) Rs(1− fs)
µs
1−σs
=
=
τµmm
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µm
]
ρS
aσs
(σmσs − σmµs − µmσs) (σs − µs)
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
(1− fs)
σs−1−µs
1−σs .
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The real wage of the service workers in the empty region tends to zero if σs < 1 + µs and
to plus infinity if σs > 1 + µs. Notice also that with σs = 1 + µs, we have ωs1 > ωs2 (in the
limit).
We conclude that concentration of both sectors in a single region is an equilibrium if and
only if σs ≤ 1 + µs. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
Since regions are symmetric, we only study the case in which all the industrial activity is
concentrated in region 1.
When fm = 1, the difference between the real wages of the service sector workers is:
ωs1 − ωs2 = µsK
K1
[
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
f
1− µs
σs−1
s
− σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
]
.
We begin our proof by calculating the values of fs ∈ (0, 1) for which ωs1 − ωs2 = 0. Since
K and K1 are strictly positive and finite:
0 =
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
f
1− µs
σs−1
s
− σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
⇔
⇔ 1− fs
fs
=
 σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
]

σs−1
σs−1−µs
. (47)
Simplifying:
fs =
1{
σm(1−µsσs )−µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m [σm(1−µsσs )+µm]
} σs−1
σs−1−µs
+ 1
. (48)
Notice that since φ
µm
1−σm
m > 1, we have:
0 <
σm(1− µsσs )− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
] < 1.
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Therefore, since σs > µs + 1, we have:
0 <
 σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
]

σs−1
σs−1−µs
< 1
and
1
2
< fs < 1.
It remains to verify the equilibrium condition for the industrial sector.
When the skilled workers in the industrial sector are concentrated in region 1, the difference
between the real wages of the industrial workers is:
ωm1 − ωm2 =
=
µmK
φmK1
2φm(σs − µs)f µs1−σss −
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m + 1)
]
− µs(φ2m + 1)
φ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
 .
Then, ωm1 − ωm2 > 0 if and only if:
2φm(σs − µs)
f
µs
1−σs
s
>
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m + 1)
]
− µs(φ2m + 1)
φ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
⇔
⇔
(
1− fs
fs
) µs
1−σs
>
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m + 1)
]
− µs(φ2m + 1)
2φm(σs − µs)φ
µm
1−σm
m
Replacing equation (47), we obtain: σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
]

−µs
σs−1−µs
>
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m + 1)
]
− µs(φ2m + 1)
2(σs − µs)φ
µm
1−σm+1
m
.
Rearranging: [
σm(1− µsσs )− µm
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
] −µs
σs−1−µs
φ
1− µm(σs−1)
(σm−1)(σs−1−µs)
m
−
φ2m
[
σs(1 +
µm
σm
)− µs
]
+ σs(1− µsσm )− µs
2(σs − µs) > 0.
(49)
33
Concentration of all the industrial activity in a region and asymmetric dispersion of the
service activity is a steady-state when the above condition is satisfied. Lemma 3.3. provides
the stability condition, guaranteeing that it is an equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3.
From equation (46), the sign of ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fs
is equal to the sign of ∂(ω¯s1−ω¯s2)
∂fs
.
Calculating the partial derivatives:
∂ω¯s1
∂fs
=
(
−1 + µs
σs − 1
) σm (1− µsσs)− µm 1−fm(1+φm)1−fm(1−φm)
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm
f
−2+ µs
σs−1
s ,
∂ω¯s2
∂fs
=
(
1− µs
σs − 1
) σm (1− µsσs)− µmfm(1+φm)−φmfm(1−φm)+φm
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm
(1− fs)−2+
µs
σs−1 .
With σs > µs + 1, we find that, for fs ∈ (0, 1):
∂ω¯s1
∂fs
< 0,
∂ω¯s2
∂fs
> 0.
When fs ∈ {0, 1}, one of these partial derivatives is null, but we still have ∂ω¯s1
∂fs
<
∂ω¯s2
∂fs
. 
Proof of Claim 3.4.
Inspection of the expressions for ωm1 − ωm2 and ωs1 − ωs2 shows that continuity of these
differences and their derivatives depends on the denominator in (45) not being zero. This
is the case since K1 and K2 are positive. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5.
When (fs, fm) = (
1
2
, 1
2
), we have ω¯m1 = ω¯m2 and ω¯s1 = ω¯s2.
Therefore, we also have ωm1 = ωm2 and ωs1 = ωs2. 
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Proof of Lemma 3.6.
We want to prove that ∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂fs
> 0.
From (45), we know that the sign of ∂(ω¯m1−ω¯m2)
∂fs
is the same.
Calculating the partial derivatives:
∂ω¯m1
∂fs
=
2φmfm (σs − µs) + (1− fm)
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs (φ2m + 1)
}
σs−1
µs
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
,
∂ω¯m2
∂fs
= −
2φm(1− fm) (σs − µs) + fm
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs (φ2m + 1)
}
σs−1
µs
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
.
Substituting (fs, fm) = (
1
2
, 1
2
), we find that:
∂ (ω¯m1 − ω¯m2)
∂fs
=
2φm (σs − µs)
σs−1
µs
[
1
2
(1 + φm)
] µm
1−σm 2−1+
µs
σs−1
> 0.

Proof of Lemma 3.7.
We want to prove that ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fm
> 0. Using equation (46), we determine the partial
derivative:
∂(ωs1 − ωs2)
∂fm
=
∂
∂fm
[
µsK
{
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
+ fm (1− fm) (1 + φ2m)
}
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
]
(ω¯s1 − ω¯s2) +
+
∂ (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2)
∂fm
[
µsK
{
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
+ fm (1− fm) (1 + φ2m)
}
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
]
.
Since we are evaluating the derivative at (fs, fm) = (
1
2
, 1
2
), the first term disappears:
∂(ωs1 − ωs2)
∂fm
=
∂ (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2)
∂fm
[
µsK (2φm + 1 + φ
2
m)
2φmK1 +K2
]
.
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The partial derivative of ω¯s1 with respect to fm is:
∂ω¯s1
∂fm
=
1
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
×
× µm (1 + φm) [1− fm(1− φm)] + (φm − 1) [1− fm(1 + φm)]
[1− fm(1− φm)]2
+
+
1{
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
}2 ×
× µm
σm − 1 [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm−1 f
1− µs
σs−1
s (1− φm)×
×
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µm 1− fm (1 + φm)
1− fm (1− φm)
]
.
Substituting (fs, fm) = (
1
2
, 1
2
):
∂ω¯s1
∂fm
∣∣∣∣
(fs,fm)=( 12 ,
1
2)
=
µm
[
(1 + φm)
(
1
2
+ 1
2
φm
)
+ (φm − 1)
(
1
2
− 1
2
φm
)](
1
2
+ 1
2
φm
) µm
1−σm 2−1+
µs
σs−1
(
1
2
+ 1
2
φm
)2 +
+
µm
σm−1
(
1
2
+ 1
2
φm
) µm
1−σm−1 2−1+
µs
σs−1 (1− φm)[(
1
2
+ 1
2
φm
) µm
1−σm 2−1+
µs
σs−1
]2 [σm(1− µsσs
)
− µm
1
2
− 1
2
φm
1
2
+ 1
2
φm
]
.
Both terms are positive, therefore, ∂ωs1
∂fm
> 0.
By symmetry, ωs2
∂fm
= −∂ωs1
∂fm
. Hence, we conclude that ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fm
∣∣∣
fm=fs=
1
2
is positive. 
Proof of Lemma 3.8.
Since regions are symmetric, we only need to study the case in which industry is concentrated
in region 1 and services are concentrated in region 2. We look at points near (fm, fs) = (1, 0)
and at what happens when first fm → 1 and then fs → 0.
The difference between the real wages in the industrial sector when all the industry is located
in region 1 and all the services are located in region 2 is:
ωm1 − ωm2 = Km
K1
(ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) .
Notice that the constants Ks and K1 are strictly positive and finite.
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Observe also that when (fm, fs) = (1, 0), we have ω¯m1 = 0 and ω¯m2 > 0.
Therefore, ωm1 < ωm2.
Concentration of each sector in a different region is never an equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 3.9.
Since regions are symmetric, it is enough to study the case in which services are symmetri-
cally dispersed while the industry is concentrated in region 1.
The difference between the real wages in the service sector when fs = 0.5 and fm = 1 is:
ωs1 − ωs2 = 4µsK
K1
(ω¯s1 − ω¯s2) .
The constants K and K1 are strictly positive and finite.
With (fs, fm) =
(
1
2
, 1
)
, we have ω¯s2 = ω¯s1φ
µm
σm−1
m < ω¯s1.
Therefore, ωs2 < ωs1.
Symmetric dispersion of services with concentration of industry cannot be an equilibrium.

Proof of Lemma 3.10.
Since regions are symmetric, it is enough to study the case in which industry is dispersed
while services are concentrated in region 2 (fs = 0).
From expression (45), the difference between the real wages in the industrial sector is:
ωm1 − ωm2 = µmK
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
(ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) .
With fs = 0, we have ω¯m1 = 0 and ω¯m2 > 0.
This implies that ωm1 < ωm2, because K, K1 and K2 are strictly positive and finite.
Dispersion of industry with concentration of services cannot be an equilibrium. 
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